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ABSTRACT 
Insurance is a key risk sharing mechanism that protects citizens and governments from the losses 
caused by natural catastrophes. Given the increase in the frequency and intensity of natural 
catastrophes over recent years, this paper analyzes the performance effects of mega-catastrophes for 
U.S. insurance firms using a measure of market expectations. Specifically, we analyze the share 
price losses of insurance firms in response to catastrophe events to ascertain whether mega-
catastrophes significantly damage the performance of insurers and whether different types of mega-
catastrophes have different impacts. The main message from our analysis is that the impact of mega-
catastrophes on insurers has not been too damaging. While the exact impact of catastrophes depends 
on the nature of the event and the degree of competition within the relevant insurance market (less 
competition allows insurers to recoup catastrophe losses through adjustments to premiums), our 
overall results suggest that U.S. insurance firms can adequately manage the risks and costs of mega-
catastrophes. From a public policy perspective, our results show that insurance provides a robust 
means of sharing catastrophe losses to help reduce the financial consequences of a catastrophe 
event. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Governments within developed economies depend, to varying degrees, on insurance 
firms to protect their citizens from the losses associated with natural catastrophes. In the 
absence of insurance, catastrophe losses are likely to cause severe hardship and falls in the 
living standards of affected households. In the U.S. and a number of other countries (for 
example, Mexico, Chile, France, Germany, Japan and the UK), governments partly assume 
responsibility for some catastrophe risks in regions where these risks are high and, 
therefore, deemed uninsurable.(1) For instance, governments may choose to partly 
reimburse citizens for catastrophe losses where citizens are insufficiently insured. However, 
where governments act as backstops for catastrophe losses, this can have adverse effects on 
public finances if large perils trigger substantial payouts to citizens.  
Therefore, next to protecting citizens, catastrophe insurance also protects 
governments from the losses linked to natural perils. Further, the risk sharing provided by 
insurance is potentially efficient in that it offers incentives to the insured to reduce the 
economic losses linked to natural perils ex ante. For instance, insurance contracts can limit 
economic losses by rewarding well-designed buildings with lower premiums, lower 
deductibles and higher coverage limits on insurance policies.(2) Given the importance of 
insurance as a robust and efficient risk sharing mechanism, questions over the extent to 
which insurers can manage the risks and costs of catastrophe losses are issues of great 
importance from a public policy perspective. 
In recent years, there has been a remarkable increase in the frequency and severity 
of natural catastrophes; for instance, the economic losses from natural catastrophes 
increased from $528 billion (1981-1990) to $1.6 trillion over the period 2001-2011.(3) Out 
of the 25 most costly catastrophes (in terms of inflation-adjusted insured losses) between 
1970 and 2009, 14 have occurred since 2001.(4) 
One cause for concern is how far insurance firms have been able to cope with the 
significant increase in underwriting losses from catastrophe events in recent years. Mega-
catastrophes, such as Hurricane Katrina in 2005 or the recent earthquake and tsunami in 
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Japan, are high-severity and low-frequency events which can be particularly costly to 
insurance firms. The high-severity nature of mega-catastrophes causes large underwriting 
losses, while the low frequency nature of mega-catastrophes means they are difficult to 
predict and incorporate into the premium pricing for catastrophe coverage.  Therefore, the 
performance implications of mega-catastrophes on insurance firms should be a concern for 
both governments and citizens.(5) 
Given the above concern, the purpose of this study is to analyse two related research 
questions.  First, do mega-catastrophes significantly damage the performance of insurance 
firms?  Second, do different types of mega-catastrophe have different impacts on insurance 
firm performance?   These questions are addressed by analysing the expected performance 
implications of mega-catastrophes on U.S. property-liability (P&L) insurance firms.  More 
specifically, by using detailed data on homeowners’ insurance coverage by state, firm and 
year, we compute the market revaluation effects realized by P&L insurers with risk 
exposure to mega-catastrophes in response to 19 U.S. mega-catastrophes. Our sample of 
insurers is substantial and includes the near population of publicly traded U.S. P&L 
insurers with loss exposure to homeowner’s business during 1996 to 2010.  
Addressing the first research question, we demonstrate that across the series of 19 
U.S. mega-catastrophes, shareholders in U.S. P&L insurers realize wealth losses on 
average.  However, the relatively small magnitude of these wealth losses suggests that the 
expected performance effects of mega-catastrophes are by no means devastating.  Since the 
value losses we report are of moderate order, our results paint a cautiously optimistic 
picture in terms of the ability of insurers to manage the risks and costs of catastrophe 
losses. Insurance, therefore, appears a robust instrument for sharing catastrophe losses. 
Moving onto the second research question, the analysis shows that the equity 
revaluation effects vary significantly across the different types of catastrophe.  More 
specifically, the analysis shows that hurricanes have less negative value implications for 
insurers than other catastrophe events. This is particularly reassuring, because hurricanes 
have historically been the most devastating peril in the U.S. and risk sharing via insurance 
firms is particularly important for hurricanes. Furthermore, catastrophes that occurred after 
Hurricane Katrina in 2005 receive a less negative market reaction than catastrophes that 
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occurred pre-Katrina. The latter finding is in line with explanations that Hurricane Katrina 
caused the insurance industry to upwardly revise its expectations of the potential magnitude 
and frequency of mega-catastrophes.  Put differently, post-Katrina, the insured losses 
caused by mega-catastrophes have been better anticipated by insurers and have been 
reflected in the premium income of P&L insurers.    
Recent empirical work emphasizes the need for government-assisted insurance to 
supplement private insurance arrangements where weather-related natural disasters cannot 
be insured by private insurance alone.(1, 4, 6, 7) This literature sees a continued role for 
governments in the provision of insurance to households in partnership with private 
insurers and acknowledges that more needs to be done to understand the ability of private 
insurance to cope with increasing catastrophe losses. Our paper contributes to this literature 
by analyzing how robust a risk sharing mechanism private insurance is when it comes to 
underwriting catastrophe risk. Overall, our analysis shows that U.S. insurance firms have 
coped remarkably well with the increasing frequency and severity of mega-catastrophes, 
and have adjusted their business model post Hurricane Katrina.   
From a public policy perspective, our results show that insurance appears to provide 
a robust mechanism for sharing catastrophe losses and can form part of comprehensive 
national strategies to deal with catastrophes. Insurance can help deal with some of the 
financial consequences of a natural catastrophe. However, it needs to be realized that any 
financial coverage should only ever be part of an overall national strategy for dealing with 
the increasing risks and losses associated with catastrophes. More specifically, insurance 
solutions need to be seen as complements to risk assessment, risk perception, risk 
prevention and risk mitigation, and this also applies to humanitarian relief in the immediate 
aftermath of a catastrophe event (such as that provided by the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency). Nonetheless, the evidence presented here shows that the catastrophe 
insurance provided by the private sector can form a meaningful part of broader national 
strategies to deal with the increasing threats and costs of catastrophe. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the 
data and empirical strategy employed to gauge changes in the value of insurers in response 
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to mega-catastrophes. Sections 3 and 4 present the results of the univariate and multivariate 
analysis, respectively, and Section 5 offers conclusions. 
2 DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
2.1 Data 
We use two main types of data to analyze the impact of mega-catastrophes on the 
performance of publicly traded P&L insurers during the period from 1996 to 2010: data on 
the magnitude and geographic spread of mega-catastrophes as well as financial data on 
P&L insurers. 
To collect data on mega-catastrophes, we obtain statistics on insured property losses 
from Property Claims Service (PCS). The data include information about the date, value of 
first insured loss estimates, and the states affected by catastrophe events that cause $25 
million or more in direct insured losses to property.* PCS uses surveys of insurers, agents, 
adjusters, public officials, and others to gather data on claim volumes and loss estimates. 
The data cover insurance payments for property lines of insurance including, fixed 
property, building contents, time-element losses, vehicles, and inland marine (diverse goods 
and properties). 
Since our study focuses on U.S. homeowners’ exposure, we restrict our sample of 
catastrophe events to natural catastrophes, i.e. events which are caused by natural forces. 
Terrorism attacks or man-made disasters (such as aviation accidents and explosions) are not 
included in our sample, because these disasters are more likely to impact on commercial 
(rather than homeowners’) lines and because these disasters only affect a small number of 
policies. Further, we only include catastrophe events with first insured loss estimates in 
excess of $1 billion and we call these events mega-catastrophes.† 
                                                       
* The threshold of $25 million of insured losses applies to the total event, i.e. insured losses at the state level 
can be (much) smaller than $25 million. 
† First insured loss estimates are adjusted for inflation using the All Urban Consumer Price Index for the 
United States (CPI-U) for a base year 2010. 
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From an initial sample of 24 mega-catastrophes, we exclude five catastrophes to 
avoid overlaps in the examination period of up to 20 trading days after the event occurred.* 
Our final sample, therefore, consists of 19 mega-catastrophes which can be broken down 
into 191 state-level catastrophes, which in turn make it an ideal landscape for research.† 
Our sample covers more than $80 billion in first insured loss estimates (which corresponds 
to nearly 40 percent of total first insured loss estimates) during 1996 to 2010 according to 
the PCS data.‡ 
Table I provides descriptive statistics on the mega-catastrophes we include in our 
analysis. 
[Table I near here] 
The data presented in Panel A include the catastrophe date, the peril type (hurricane, storm, 
etc.), the affected states as well as first insured loss estimates for all 19 sample mega-
catastrophes. Panel B presents the number of mega-catastrophes broken down by state. 
With a total of nine events, hurricanes make up the majority of our sample of mega-
catastrophes. Further, Florida and Massachusetts are the states most frequently hit by mega-
catastrophes in our sample (i.e. 11 times each). 
To build our sample of publicly traded P&L insurers in the U.S., we first download 
a list of firms which both the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and 
Datastream classify as P&L insurers (based on a SIC code of 6330 or 6331). This yields an 
initial sample of 142 publicly traded P&L insurers. In cases where only one database 
identifies a firm as a P&L insurer, we check the firm’s website to confirm its specialization. 
This way, we can identify an additional 26 P&L insurers. 
                                                       
* The omitted mega-catastrophes are Hurricane France (04.09.2004), Hurricanes Jeanne and Ivan (both 
15.09.2004), as well as Hurricane Gustav (31.08.2008) and Hurricane Ike (12.09.2008). 
† We obtain the number of state-level catastrophes by summing up the number of states which are affected by 
a mega-catastrophe. For example, if a hurricane affects four states, we count four state-level catastrophes. 
‡ The PCS database holds records on 414 individual natural catastrophe events during the period 1996 to 2010 
which have caused total first insured loss estimates of nearly $215 billion. 
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We then match the sample of P&L insurers with data on premium earnings 
compiled from the State Pages of insurers’ annual filings with the National Association of 
Insurance Commissioners (NAIC). The NAIC filings provide detailed state-level data on 
the composition of an insurer’s premium income. To ensure that sample firms are P&L 
insurers with at least some relevant risk exposure to mega-catastrophes, we only include 
insurers in the sample if the NAIC filings show that insurers have homeowners’ loss 
exposure at the time of a mega-catastrophe. That is, insurers need to have positive 
premiums earned in the homeowners’ line in the year the catastrophe occurred.* Finally, we 
require sample firms to have accounting and share price information on COMPUSTAT and 
CRSP, respectively. Our final sample consists of 57 publicly traded P&L firms. A list of 
our sample of insurers is provided in Appendix Table A2. 
2.2 Methodology 
To estimate the impact of mega-catastrophes on insurance firms’ stock price 
performance during the period 1996 to 2010, we use market-adjusted abnormal returns† 
(AR) as employed by others: (8, 9) 
                                                       
* As insurance premiums are usually paid in advance, it is common to classify premiums into premiums 
written and premiums earned. While premiums written are equal to the revenues from insurance policies sold 
in a given period, earned premiums are equal to the portion of premiums written which is actually exposed to 
loss. For example, if an annual policy begins on July 1, the written premium is equal to the total revenue of 
that policy (usually the price of the policy), while premiums earned would only make up half the policy’s total 
revenue. Since we are interested in the actual loss exposure of individual insurers, we use earned premiums as 
in other studies.(10) 
† We do not estimate market model-adjusted returns (which yield risk-adjusted returns) for two reasons. First, 
the market model approach assumes that the estimation period over which market model parameters are 
estimated is free of the type of event whose value effects are being investigated. If we were to compute risk-
adjusted abnormal returns using contaminated estimation periods, the resulting estimates would be unreliable. 
Since our sample of insurers contains firms that are hit by more than a single mega-catastrophe in close 
succession, we do not have the clean time series of return data necessary to implement this approach. Second, 
over short-time periods risk-adjusted return values do not significantly improve estimation results as 
compared to the type of market-adjusted values we employ in this study. 
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       (1) 
where rit is the return for insurer i on day t and rmt is the CRSP equally-weighted 
market index return for day t.* Equity return data are from CRSP. We average AR across 
days and firms to yield cumulative abnormal returns (CAR). To test for the statistical 
significance of cumulative abnormal returns, we employ a two tailed t-test as well as the 
non-parametric Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test which is robust to the effects of outliers. 
With the exception of hurricanes, we define the event date as the trading day on which the 
mega-catastrophe took place (if the event occurs on a non-trading day, we use the next 
trading day instead). For hurricanes, we use the first trading day during the two calendar 
days before the event date.† This is because hurricanes can be tracked with a fair amount of 
accuracy and, consequently, we expect some information leakage prior to the hurricane 
hitting land.  
3 UNIVARIATE RESULTS 
3.1 The Shareholder Wealth Effects of Mega-catastrophes 
In this subsection we examine changes in the market value of P&L insurers in 
response to mega-catastrophes. Table II reports insurers’ market adjusted abnormal returns 
linked to our sample of mega-catastrophes for selected event windows.  Thus, for all event 
windows after the catastrophe event date, cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) are negative 
and statistically significant at the 1%-level (for both t-tests and z-tests), ranging from -
0.279 percent on day one to -1.393 percent 20 days after the event date.  Based on the 
                                                       
* We use the CRSP-equally-weighted market index for market returns. This return index is more dominated 
by returns on smaller firms (relative to a value-weighted index). This is appropriate for our sample of small 
and medium sized P&L insurers (the median sample firm is smaller than the median firm included in the 
CRSP indices). Further, numerous previous studies on the performance implications of catastrophe events for 
insurers have also employed the CRSP-equally-weighted index.(11-13) 
† For example, if the hurricane occurs on a Monday, our set-up assumes that the event could have been 
forecast since Saturday. As Saturday is not a trading day (and no market reaction can be observed that day), 
we use Monday as the first day of the analysis in this case. 
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results, we conclude that the prospect of potentially substantial loss reimbursements to 
policyholders outweigh any expected benefits of potential premium increases in the 
aftermath of a catastrophe event.  
[Table II near here] 
However, Table II also shows that the sample is nearly split equally in half as 
regards firm observations experiencing value gains and value losses from mega-
catastrophes and there is heterogeneity in the market valuation effects linked to mega-
catastrophes. The next subsections, therefore, identify some of the factors which determine 
the market reaction to catastrophe events.  
3.2 Value Effects and Insurers’ Loss Exposure 
In this subsection we investigate how an insurer’s loss exposure impacts upon 
changes in the insurer market value in response to a mega-catastrophe. It is important to 
understand to what extent loss exposure can explain our results. For instance, the relatively 
modest value losses for insurers we report above could be driven by insurers with little or 
no exposure to mega catastrophes. These unexposed insurers may benefit from additional 
insurance demand following a catastrophe event without having to indemnify existing 
policyholders for insured losses. We capture loss exposure using the homeowners’ 
premium income earned in the states affected by a mega-catastrophe.  
Figure 1 presents a graphical comparison of cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for 
both unexposed and exposed insurers up to 20 days following a mega-catastrophe. We 
classify firms as either exposed or unexposed based on whether or not they have positive 
premiums earned in the homeowners’ line of business in any affected state(s). Two 
important conclusions can be drawn from Figure 1. First, mega-catastrophes have different 
performance implications for exposed and unexposed insurers. While exposed insurers 
experience negative CAR throughout the 20 days following a mega-catastrophe, CAR for 
unexposed insurers becomes positive 11 days after the catastrophe event. Second, Figure 1 
provides graphical evidence of a delay in the market response to mega-catastrophes. The 
return difference between exposed and unexposed insurers widens around 10 days after the 
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catastrophe event. A delay in the market response may be attributable to a lack of data on 
expected loss estimates (14), the degree to which damaged property was insured or due to 
effects on the demand for insurance. 
[Figure 1 near here] 
To more formally test these propositions, Table A.III in the Appendix reports CAR 
for different event windows following mega-catastrophes by whether or not insurers had 
loss exposure (Panel A). In addition, the level of loss exposure (defined as the ratio of 
direct earned homeowner premiums in the affected states to nationwide direct earned 
homeowner premiums in the year the catastrophe struck) is examined in Panel B. 
Table A.III reports three important findings. First, and in line with Figure 1, it 
shows that insurers exposed to catastrophes suffer value losses, while insurers with no 
earned premium in the affected states (unexposed insurers) are not affected by mega-
catastrophes. Second, it also shows that a higher level of loss exposure negatively impacts 
upon the stock price performance of insurers. Finally, it confirms that insurers’ wealth 
losses in response to mega-catastrophes are rather modest, indicating that mega-
catastrophes do not have devastating performance effects on insurers. Thus, on average, 
even insurers located in the highest quartile (Q4) of the distribution of loss exposure 
experience share price losses of less than 5 percent during the event period (Panel B), while 
the share price losses for the subsample of exposed insurers is less than 2 percent (Panel A). 
3.3 Value Effects and Competition in the Homeowners’ Insurance Market 
An additional factor that may influence an insurer’s stock price reaction is the level 
of competition at the state level in the homeowners’ insurance market.  Insurers are likely 
to face more difficulty in raising premiums when operating in highly competitive states as 
compared to insurers operating in states with little competition in the homeowners’ 
insurance market.  More specifically, it could be argued that premium increases after a 
mega-catastrophe will be smaller in highly competitive states (which will make it more 
difficult to offset initial reimbursements paid to policyholders and capital depletions) as 
compared to states with low levels of competition, because premium increases in more 
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competitive states are likely to result in a permanent loss of market share. Therefore, it is 
conceivable that our result of relatively modest value losses for insurance firms around 
catastrophe losses may be partly caused by the competition levels prevailing in different 
states. For instance, if the insurance firms most affected by mega catastrophes are operating 
in states with low levels of competition (and a high prospect of premium increases after the 
event), this could go some way to explaining why our results show that the value losses of 
catastrophes for insurance firms are not too devastating.  
We calculate a measure of competition in two steps. In a first step, we calculate the 
sum of the squared percentages of homeowners’ insurance premiums earned (relative to the 
total homeowners’ insurance premium earned by all insurers) for each state and year. The 
resulting Herfindahl index measures the concentration of premium income (or lack of 
competition) in the homeowners’ insurance market in each state. In a second step, we 
calculate the average Herfindahl index across the states in which an insurer operates by 
weighting the Herfindahl index by the proportion of homeowners’ insurance premiums 
earned in each state relative to the nationwide total of direct homeowner premiums. Since 
the resulting Herfindahl index captures the lack of competition across the states in which an 
insurer operates, we compute 1-Herfindahl index to yield a measure of competition. The 
competition measure ranges from 0 to 1, with higher values indicating increased 
competition for an insurer. 
Table A.IV in the Appendix reports market-adjusted cumulative abnormal returns 
for different event windows after a mega-catastrophe for the highest (Q4) and lowest 
quartile (Q1) of the distribution of the competition measure and shows the differences in 
abnormal returns between the highest and lowest quartile (ΔCARHIGH-LOW).  For the sample 
as a whole, as well as for the subsample of exposed insurers (Panel B), the results show that 
the value losses are greater when insurers predominantly operate in the most competitive 
states as compared to insurers operating in the least competitive states. Further, we find that 
unexposed insurers (Panel C) benefit from mega-catastrophes if they write business in the 
least competitive states.   
Overall, the results in this sub-section show competition amongst insurers 
conditions their business responses to mega-catastrophes. Most importantly, even in the 
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most competitive states, where insurance firms should find it most challenging to increase 
premiums following a catastrophe event, the value losses causes by mega catastrophes 
remain of a modest order. This confirms our main finding that the damage which market 
investors believe mega catastrophes inflict on insurance firms is modest and it demonstrates 
that insurance is a robust sharing mechanism for catastrophe risk. 
4 MULTIVARIATE RESULTS 
4.1 The Model 
Next, we use multivariate regression analyses to assess the robustness of our 
findings in the univariate analysis and to jointly estimate the various factors which affect 
the market reaction of insurers to mega-catastrophes. Specifically, we estimate the 
following model via OLS with robust standard errors. 
      (2) 
where CAR[0,+15] is the market-adjusted mean cumulative abnormal return over 
[0,+15] days relative to the catastrophe event date, IC is a vector of insurer characteristics 
in the fiscal quarter before the catastrophe event, and CC is a vector of catastrophe event 
characteristics. 
[Table III near here] 
We use a multi-week event window as in previous studies.(11, 15) We require a multi-
week event window to ensure that our event window coincides with the disclosure of 
important information about a catastrophe event to market investors. The PCS catastrophe 
database we use shows that, on average, a catastrophe lasts for 3 to 4 days and that it takes 
another 9 to 10 days before the first estimate of insured losses are published.   Figure 1 and 
Table A.III in the Appendix confirm that it takes around ten days for a more substantial 
market response to a mega-catastrophe to materialize. Finally, to control for the effect of 
unobserved variables that are constant over years and insurers, we also include firm and 
year fixed effects into our model. 
  12 
Table III includes descriptions and summary statistics for the vector of insurer 
characteristic and control variables. All accounting data (unless stated differently) refer to 
one fiscal quarter prior to the catastrophe event date and are from COMPUSTAT. Premium 
income data refer to the current fiscal year of the catastrophe event and are from NAIC 
insurer filings. Loss estimates are from the PCS database. 
4.2 Regression Results 
This sub section presents the results of the regressions on market-adjusted 
cumulative abnormal returns (CAR[0,+15]) in response to mega-catastrophes. The results 
shown in Table IV confirm our main findings from the univariate tests above. First, capital 
markets distinguish among firms based on the existence as well as the magnitude of an 
insurer’s loss exposure. Thus, EXPOSED (a dummy variable which equals 1 if the insurer 
has positive homeowners’ premium earned in the affected state (and 0 otherwise)) and 
EXPOSURE (the ratio of homeowners’ premium earned in the affected state(s) to total 
homeowners’ premium earned (%)) both enter with a negative and statistically significant 
coefficients at the 1%-level.* This is consistent with arguments that investors devalue those 
insurers in the aftermath of catastrophe events which face potential reimbursements paid to 
policyholders and that higher loss exposures (which are associated with higher depletions 
of internal capital) lead to less favourable stock price performance around a mega-
catastrophe. Second, LOWCOMPETITION enters the regression models with a positive 
and statistically significant coefficient (at the 1%-level) which shows that firms are more 
likely to benefit from mega-catastrophes when they write homeowners’ insurance in the 
least competitive states. This is consistent with the argument that firms can more easily 
increase premiums in response to mega-catastrophes in states with lower competition as 
compared to states with higher competition where premium increases are likely to result in 
a permanent loss of market share. 
In addition to our results at the univariate level we find further variables which 
significantly impact on the stock price response of insurers. TOBQ (Tobin’s Q measured as 
                                                       
* We do not simultaneously include EXPOSED and EXPOSURE in one model as we find a high correlation 
between them. 
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the market value of equity plus the book value of liabilities divided by the book value of 
assets), for example, is negatively related with abnormal returns at the 5% level. We argue 
that loss events, such as mega-catastrophes, which lead to internal capital depletion are 
more severe for firms with strong growth prospects than for firms whose market value is 
more dependent on assets in place. That is because capital for new investments is more 
important for growth-orientated firms. 
[Table IV near here] 
Also, we report a negative relationship (at the 5% level) between the amount of first 
insured loss estimates (CATSIZE) and insurers’ stock price reaction. This result was 
anticipated, as more expensive catastrophes (in terms of insured losses) lead to higher loss 
payments. Finally, we report that mega-catastrophes which are caused by hurricanes as well 
as catastrophes which occurred after Hurricane Katrina have positive value implications for 
insurers. Thus, both HURRICANE and POSTKATRINA are positive and statistically 
significant (at the 5%-level and 1%-level, respectively). This is in line with the arguments 
that the risk models for hurricanes are amongst the most advanced and most accurate (as 
regards the estimation of the probability of potential losses of future hurricanes) and that 
Hurricane Katrina caused the insurance industry to upwardly revise its expectations 
regarding the potential magnitude of all natural disaster losses (and not only windstorm 
events) which resulted in a smaller ‘shock effect’ for mega-catastrophes following Katrina 
as large-scaled losses by natural catastrophes were anticipated by capital markets 
(Cummins and Lewis, 2003). 
To check the above results we undertake a number of additional tests.  Due to space 
limitations we do not report the tables here but they are available from the authors upon 
request.  First, we assess whether our results are sensitive to the event window used. For 
this purpose, we re-run our analysis of market-adjusted mean cumulative abnormal return 
using [0,+1], [0,+5] [0,+10] and [0,+20] days relative to the catastrophe event date as event 
windows. The results of this test show that all event windows confirm our main conclusions 
as the regression results remain qualitatively unaffected.   Next, we examine the stability of 
our results after excluding Hurricane Katrina from our sample of mega-catastrophes. We do 
so, because Hurricane Katrina is the most expensive natural catastrophe in insurance 
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history (in terms of insured losses) which may influence the results we report.  The results 
show that all the main conclusions remain unaffected. 
5 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we examine a cross-section of 19 mega-catastrophes between 1996 and 
2010 to shed light on two questions: first, what are the expected performance effects of 
mega-catastrophes on insurance firms,  and second, do different types of mega-catastrophe 
have different impacts on insurance firm performance? Both questions have important 
consequences for the ability of insurance firms to protect citizens and governments from 
the losses caused by catastrophe events and to form part of broader national strategies to 
deal with the increasing risks and costs of catastrophe.  
In terms of the first question our results show that mega-catastrophe have negative 
performance implications for insurers. However, the magnitude of share price losses during 
the examination period is moderate on average. We interpret this as evidence that the 
expected performance implications of mega-catastrophes are by no means devastating for 
insurers. This has important implications for the viability of insurance as a robust risk-
sharing mechanism because it demonstrates that insurers are in a position to absorb the 
losses caused by mega-catastrophes (1) and that mega-catastrophes do not threaten the 
solvency of insurers.   
Regarding the second question, the results show that the returns of insurers suffer 
more the greater the exposure to a mega-catastrophe and the higher the competition 
amongst insurers (the latter precludes insurers from increasing premiums to offset the 
underwriting losses associated with a mega-catastrophe).  In addition, the results indicate 
that insurance firms are better able to cope with hurricane mega-catastrophes and that they 
have adjusted their models post Hurricane Katrina. These results are in line with the 
arguments that the risk models for hurricanes are amongst the most advanced and that 
Hurricane Katrina caused the insurance industry to upwardly revise its expectations 
regarding the potential magnitude of all natural disaster losses.(11)  
  15 
While our results are based on U.S. insurers only (and it remains to be tested 
whether similar results hold for non-U.S. insurers), they provide evidence that insurers are 
in a position to absorb the losses caused by mega-catastrophes and that mega-catastrophes 
do not threaten the solvency of insurers. This implies that insurance is an effective 
mechanism to channel catastrophe losses away from households and governments. This 
result is also important given that climate change is likely to make the insurance sector 
subject to heightened exposure to weather-related perils and insurance can play a key role 
in helping (along with better risk assessment, risk perception, risk management and disaster 
response) to alleviate the negative impact of climate change for households and 
governments (1). 
Three important policy implications derive from our work and focus on what 
policymakers can do to increase the supply of insurance as an effective risk-sharing 
mechanism. First, in a number of countries governments engage in the provision of 
insurance to households where catastrophe losses are deemed uninsurable alongside private 
insurers.(1, 4, 7) While our study has little to say about the adequacy or effects of the public 
provision of insurance, they show that private insurance firms are coping well with mega-
catastrophes and justifies cautious optimism as regards the viability of private insurance 
helping to meet the costs associated with catastrophe. Private insurance is desirable, 
because it is widely seen as more economically efficient than public insurance. For 
instance, private insurance rewards behavior which lowers the economic costs of a peril 
(via lower premiums) when, say, policyholders make their property more catastrophe-
proof.(6) While not directly tied to the results presented here, the private insurance industry 
may also have the processing capacity to help governments with broader catastrophe 
solutions. For example, the administrative resources of the private insurance sector could 
provide a platform for servicing government funded disaster recovery schemes through the 
marketing of policies, the collection of premiums, loss adjusting and the payment of claims. 
Nonetheless, given that private insurance should only ever be seen as part of a 
broader disaster resilience strategy and should not be construed as a panacea, there is a need 
for further work in this domain. More specifically, while private insurance can help to 
finance catastrophe losses, recovery and construction, and provide incentives for reducing 
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risk, it needs to be recognised that insurance could also provide disincentives. Insurance has 
the potential to convey a feeling of security while leaving people overly exposed to the 
impacts of disaster. More research on the risk behaviour effects of catastrophe insurance on 
individuals, corporations and governments could, therefore, prove very useful. 
Second, our results challenge the appropriateness of regulatory initiatives (such as 
the NAIC’s Solvency Modernization Initiative or Solvency II) that require insurance firms 
to hold substantially higher capital reserves in order to remain solvent following a 
catastrophe event. While the results reported in this paper have little to say about the 
desirability of higher capital holdings against other types of underwriting risk, they show 
that the expected financial losses linked to natural catastrophes for U.S. insurers do not 
appear to be of a magnitude to justify substantially higher capital holdings against 
catastrophe underwriting risk.  
Third, there is a trade-off between competition in local insurance markets and how 
damaging catastrophe losses are to insurance firms. We show that in less competitive 
markets where insurers should be able to increase premium income in the years following a 
catastrophe event, the expected performance losses following a catastrophe event are lower. 
Therefore, trade-offs between competition (and by extension consumer welfare which 
should increase with competition and falling insurance premiums) need to be carefully 
balanced with an insurer’s ability to profitably manage catastrophe risks. Our results 
suggest that less competition in local insurance markets makes insurance a more viable 
risk-sharing mechanism.  
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Table I 
Sample of Mega-catastrophes during 1996-2010 
Panel A: Mega-catastrophe Characteristics 
DATE 
 
PERIL STATES AFFECTED 
FIRST INSURED LOSS 
ESTIMATE 
(MILLIONS USD) 
25.08.2005  HURRICANE KATRINA  AL, FL, GA, LA, MS, TN 38,360 
13.08.2004  HURRICANE CHARLEY  FL, NC, SC 7,850 
24.10.2005  HURRICANE WILMA  FL 6,809 
20.09.2005  HURRICANE RITA  AL, AR, FL, LA, MS, TN, TX 5,243 
25.10.2003  WILDLAND FIRE  CA 2,412 
05.09.1996  HURRICANE FRAN  MD, NC, OH, PA, SC, VA, WV 2,224 
03.05.1999  WIND/THUNDERSTOR
M EVENT 
 AL, AR, FL, GA, IL, IN, KS, KY, LA, MO, MS, NC, NE, OH, OK, SC, TN, TX 1,944 
02.05.2003  WIND/THUNDERSTOR
M EVENT 
 AL, AR, CO, GA, IA, IL, IN, KS, KY, MO, MS, NC, NE, OH, OK, SC, SD, TN 1,837 
14.09.1999  HURRICANE FLOYD  CT, DE, FL, GA, MA, MD, ME, NC, NH, NJ, NY, PA, RI, SC, VA, VT 1,734 
05.06.2001  TROPICAL STORM 
ALLISON 
FL, LA, MS, NJ, PA, TX 1,502 
04.04.2003  WINTER STORM  AL, IL, IN, LA, MI, MO, MS, NY, TN, TX 1,440 
18.09.2003  HURRICANE ISABEL  DE, MD, NC, NJ, NY, PA, VA, WV 1,387 
21.10.2007  WILDLAND FIRE  CA 1,262 
12.05.2010  WIND/THUNDERSTOR
M EVENT 
 IL, MD, OK, PA, TX 1,065 
31.01.1996  WINTER STORM  AL, AR, CT, DE, FL, GA, IA, IL, IN, KS, KY, LA, MA, MD, MI, MN, MO, MS, NC, NE, 
NJ, NY, OH, OK, PA, SC, TN, TX, VA, WI, WV 
1,021 
01.01.1999  WINTER STORM  AL, AR, CT, DE, FL, GA, IL, IN, LA, MA, MD, ME, MO, MS, NC, NJ, NY, OH, OK, PA, 
RI, SC, TN, TX, VA, WV 
1,014 
13.04.2007  WIND/THUNDERSTOR
M EVENT 
 CT, DE, GA, LA, MA, MD, ME, MS, NC, NH, NJ, NY, PA, RI, SC, TX, VA, VT 1,013 
09.07.2005  HURRICANE DENNIS  AL, FL, GA, MS 1,005 
21.09.1998  HURRICANE GEORGES  AL, FL, LA, MS 1,003 
Panel B: Total Number of Mega-catastrophes broken down by State, 1996-2010 
State Events State Events State Events State Event State Events 
AK - HI - ME 3 NJ 6  SD 1 
AL 9 IA 3 MI 2 NM -  TN 7 
AR 5 ID - MN 1 NV -  TX 8 
AZ - IL 6 MO 5 NY 6  UT - 
CA 2 IN 4 MS 11 OH 5  VA 6 
CO 1 KS 3 MT - OK 5  VT 2 
CT 4 KY 3 NC 9 OR -  WA - 
DE 5 LA 8 ND - PA 9  WI 1 
FL 11 MA 4 NE 3 RI 3  WV 4 
GA 9 MD 7 NH 2 SC 8  WY - 
Notes: The sample consists of nearly all US natural catastrophes during 1996 to 2010 with first insured loss estimates exceeding 1 billion USD (mega-
catastrophes). According to the Property Claim Services (PCS) database this sample of mega-catastrophes makes up nearly 40 percent of total first insured 
loss estimates during 1996 to 2010. Insured losses are in constant 2010-USD terms based on the Consumer Price Index (All Urban Consumers). For an 
explanation of state abbreviations refer to Appendix Table A.I. Source: Property Claim Services (PCS). 
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Table II 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns for Selected Event Windows 
Event window N mean (%) median (%) CAR<0% 
(days)  (t-stat) (z-stat) N % 
CAR[-5,-1] 716 -0.179 -0.422 398 55.6 
  (-1.154) (-1.112)   
      
CAR[0,+1] 716 -0.279*** -0.401*** 419 58.5 
  (-2.840) (-5.050)   
      
CAR[0,+5] 716 -0.671*** -0.686*** 413 57.7 
  (-3.723) (-4.411)   
      
CAR[0,+10] 716 -1.105*** -0.930*** 414 57.8 
  (-4.539) (-5.035)   
      
CAR[0,+15] 716 -1.161*** -0.698*** 394 55.0 
  (-3.532) (-3.604)   
      
CAR[0,+20] 716 -1.393*** -1.292*** 408 57.0 
  (-3.777) (-4.037)   
Notes: The table reports cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for different event windows before and after the catastrophe 
event date for the period 1996 to 2010. Abnormal returns are estimated using an adjusted market model: 
ARit = Rit – Rmt 
where Rit is the observed arithmetic return for firm i at day t and Rmt is the CRSP equally-weighted market index return for 
day t. Also included are t-statistics (two tailed) and the non-parametric Mann–Whitney–Wilcoxon Z-scores. *, **, and *** 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table III 
Summary Statistics 
 Variable Definition N Mean Median Std. Dev 1 Pctile 99 Pctile 
Value effect CAR[0,+15] Market-adjusted mean cumulative abnormal return over 
[0,+15] days relative to the mega-catastrophe event date (%) 
716 -1.161 -0.698 8.796 -25.905 25.049 
FIRMSIZE Log of total assets (millions of USD) 716 8.656 8.566 2.025 5.175 13.500 
TOBQ Tobin’s Q measured as the market value of equity plus the book 
value of liabilities divided by the book value of assets 
716 1.103 1.049 0.229 0.689 1.955 
ROA The ratio of pre-tax profits to total assets (%) 716 1.047 0.879 1.628 -2.721 4.407 
LOSSRATIO  Log of loss ratio which is defined as losses incurred to 
premiums earned in the homeowners‘ line of business 
716 4.161 4.107 0.932 3.377 7.158 
EXPOSURE The ratio of homeowners’ premium earned in the affected 
state(s) to total homeowners’ premium earned (%) 
716 29.707 14.749 34.165 0.000 100.000 
EXPOSED Dummy which equals 1 if the insurer has positive homeowners’ 
premium earned in the affected state (and 0 otherwise) 
716 0.779 1.000 0.415 0.000 1.000 
LOWCOMPETITION Dummy which equals 1 if the insurer is located in the lowest 
quartile of our competition measure defined as 1-Herfindahl 
index by state-level homeowners’ premium earned multiplied 
by the individual insurer’s proportion of homeowners’ 
insurance premiums earned in the state to nationwide direct 
earned homeowner premiums in the year the catastrophe struck 
716 0.259 0.000 0.438 0.000 1.000 
HIGHRATING Dummy which equals 1 if the insurer’s financial rating assigned 
by Standard & Poor’s is AA or better (and 0 otherwise) 
716 0.056 0.000 0.229 0.000 1.000 
Insurer 
characteristics 
LINEDIVERS A measure of line diversification defined as 1-Herfindahl index 
by line of business which is calculated as the sum of the 
squared percentage of insurance premium earned in each 
business line to the total premium earned in all property-
liability lines (%) 
716 74.622 79.463 12.625 36.641 89.214 
POSTKATRINA Dummy which equals 1 if the catastrophe took place after 
hurricane Katrina (and 0 otherwise) 
716 0.208 0.000 0.406 0.000 1.000 
relCATSIZE The ratio of first insured loss estimate to total liabilities (%) 716 14.901 0.545 193.696 0.003 93.310 
CATSIZE Log of first insured loss estimate (millions of USD) in constant 
2010-USD terms based on the Consumer Price Index (All 
Urban Consumers) 
716 0.743 0.407 0.917 0.003 3.647 
Catastrophe 
characteristics 
HURRICANE Dummy which equals 1 if the catastrophe is a hurricane (and 0 
otherwise) 
716 0.474 0.000 0.499 0.000 1.000 
Notes: Accounting data (apart from premium income data) refer to one fiscal quarter prior to the catastrophe event date and are from COMPUSTAT. Premium income 
data refer to the fiscal year of the catastrophe event and are from the State Pages of insurers’ annual filings with the National Association of Insurance Commissioners 
(NAIC). Loss estimates are compiled using data from Property Claim Services (PCS). 
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Table IV 
Regressions on Insurers’ Cumulative Abnormal Returns [0,+15], All Sample Insurers 
 (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) 
FIRMSIZE -0.109 -0.102 -0.231 -0.110 -0.062 -0.178 
 (0.11) (0.10) (0.23) (0.11) (0.06) (0.17) 
TOBQ -8.109** -8.185** -8.065** -7.547** -7.567** -7.611** 
 (2.35) (2.31) (2.39) (2.21) (2.15) (2.24) 
ROA 1.036 1.035 0.912 1.038 1.030 0.940 
 (1.42) (1.41) (1.23) (1.42) (1.39) (1.26) 
LOSSRATIO 0.073 0.099 0.096 0.143 0.158 0.141 
 (0.27) (0.33) (0.32) (0.52) (0.52) (0.46) 
EXPOSURE    -0.043*** -0.045*** -0.039*** 
    (3.52) (3.69) (3.13) 
EXPOSED -3.267*** -3.455*** -3.248***    
 (3.43) (3.65) (3.48)    
LOWCOMPETITION 4.999*** 5.826*** 7.157*** 4.862*** 5.793*** 6.799*** 
 (5.88) (5.64) (6.59) (5.69) (5.56) (6.20) 
HIGHRATING  0.034 0.032  0.014 0.014 
  (0.43) (0.40)  (0.18) (0.17) 
LINEDIVERS   4.051   4.377 
   (1.35)   (1.51) 
POSTKATRINA 9.222*** 9.886*** 10.755*** 9.335*** 10.088*** 10.769*** 
 (6.63) (6.86) (7.36) (6.75) (7.02) (7.39) 
relCATSIZE -0.253 -0.241 -0.198 -0.277 -0.253 -0.217 
 (0.45) (0.42) (0.35) (0.49) (0.44) (0.38) 
CATSIZE  -0.960** -1.427***  -1.089** -1.413*** 
  (2.11) (3.11)  (2.42) (3.11) 
HURRICANE   3.226***   2.512** 
   (3.07)   (2.34) 
       
Intercept 12.490 10.736 10.013 11.894 11.242 10.485 
 (1.53) (1.16) (1.09) (1.45) (1.20) (1.12) 
Observations 716 716 716 716 716 716 
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Insurer fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Adjusted R2 0.196 0.198 0.210 0.201 0.203 0.210 
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Notes: The table reports the results of OLS regression with robust standard errors for CAR [0,+15] relative to the mega-
catastrophe event. The independent variables are the log of total assets (FIRMSIZE), the insurers’ Tobin’s Q (TOBQ) 
measured as the market value of equity plus the book value of liabilities divided by the book value of assets, the ratio of pre-
tax profits to total assets (ROA), the log of the loss ratio which is defined as losses incurred to premiums earned in the 
homeowners‘ line of business (LOSSRATIO), the ratio of homeowners’ premium earned in affected state(s) to total 
homeowners’ premium earned (EXPOSURE), a dummy which equals 1 if the insurer has positive homeowners’ premium 
earned in the affected states (EXPOSED), a dummy which equals 1 if the insurer is located in the lowest quartile of our 
competition measure defined by 1-Herfindahl index by state-level homeowners’ premium (LOWCOMPETITION), 1-
Herfindahl index by line of business (LINEDIVERS) which is calculated as the sum of the squared percentage of insurance 
premium earned in each business line to the total premium earned in all property and-liability lines, a dummy which equals 1 
if the insurer’s financial rating assigned by Standard &Poor’s is AA or better (HIGHRATING), a dummy which equals 1 if 
the catastrophe took place after hurricane Katrina (POSTKATRINA), the ratio of total insured loss to total liabilities 
(relCATSIZE), the total insured loss (billions USD) in constant 2010-USD terms based on the Consumer Price Index 
(CATSIZE) and a dummy which is equal to one if the mega-catastrophe is a hurricane (HURRICANE). Accounting data 
(apart from premium income data) refer to one fiscal quarter prior to the catastrophe event and are from COMPUSTAT. 
Premium income data refer to the current fiscal year of the catastrophe event and are from the State Pages of insurers’ annual 
filings with the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC). Loss estimates are compiled using data from 
Property Claim Services. The t-statistics (two tailed) of the coefficients are reported in the parentheses. *, **, and *** 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Figure 1 
Value Effects by Existence of Loss Exposure 
 
Notes: The figure shows market adjusted cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for both unexposed and exposed insurers for 
the 20 days following a mega-catastrophe. Exposed insurers are firms which have positive premiums earned in the 
homeowners’ line of business in the state(s) affected by our sample catastrophes. Unexposed insurers are also firms which 
have positive premiums earned in the homeowners’ line of business but only in the state(s) which are not affected by our 
sample catastrophes. Source: National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC). 
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Appendix 
Table A.I 
Explanation of State Abbreviations 
AK Alaska LA Louisiana OH Ohio 
AL Alabama MA Massachusetts OK Oklahoma 
AR Arkansas MD Maryland OR Oregon 
AZ Arizona ME Maine PA Pennsylvania 
CA California MI Michigan RI Rhode Island 
CO Colorado MN Minnesota SC South Carolina 
CT Connecticut MO Missouri SD South Dakota 
DE Delaware MS Mississippi TN Tennessee 
FL Florida MT Montana TX Texas 
GA Georgia NC North Carolina UT Utah 
HI Hawaii ND North Dakota VA Virginia 
IA Iowa NE Nebraska VT Vermont 
ID Idaho NH New Hampshire WA Washington 
IL Illinois NJ New Jersey WI Wisconsin 
IN Indiana NM New Mexico WV West Virginia 
KS Kansas NV Nevada WY Wyoming 
KY Kentucky NY New York   
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Table A.II 
Sample Firms – 57 in Total 
21st Century Insurance Group EMC Insurance Group National Security Group Inc. 
Ace Ltd. Erie Indemnity North Pointe Group 
Acceptance Insurance Corp. Everest Re Group Ohio Casualty Insurance Group 
Affirmative Insurance Holdings Inc. Farm Family Holdings Inc. Old Republic International Corp. 
Alfa Corp. First Acceptance Corp. Progressive Corp. (The) 
Allstate Corp. (The) Frontier Insurance Group Inc. Renaissance Re Holdings 
Alterra Capital Holdings Group Hallmark Financial Service Inc. Royal and Sun Alliance 
American Country Holdings Hanover Insurance Group (The) Safeco Corp. 
American Financial Group Harleysville Group Inc. Safety Insurance Group 
American International Group Hartford Financial Services Seibels Bruce Group Inc. 
Argonaut Group Inc. Homeowners Choice Inc. Selective Insurance Group 
Aspen Insurance Holdings Group Horace Mann Educators Corp. Tower Group Inc. 
AXIS Capital Group Kemper Corp. Travelers Corp. 
Berkshire Hathaway Inc. Markel Corp Group Trenwick Group Inc. 
Chubb Corp. Meadowbrook Insurance Group United Fire and Casualty Group 
Cincinnati Financial Corp. Mercer Insurance Group Inc. Universal Insurance Holdings Inc. 
CNA Insurance Group Merchants Group Inc. VESTA Insurance Group 
Commerce Group Inc. Mercury General Corp. White Mountains Insurance Group 
Donegal Group Inc. Meridian Insurance Group Inc. W.R. Berkley Corp. 
Notes: The sample consists of all publicly traded property-liability (P&L) insurers during the period 1996 to 2010 with 
positive premiums earned in the homeowners’ line from the State Pages of insurers’ annual filings with the National 
Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) as well historical accounting and stock price information on 
COMPUSTAT and CRSP, respectively. 
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Table A.III 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns by Loss Exposure 
  CAR[0,+1] CAR[0,+5] CAR[0,+10] CAR[0,+15] CAR[0,+20] 
Panel A: Existence of Loss Exposure (Yes/No) 
EXPOSED Insurers mean -0.324*** -0.724*** -1.357*** -1.710*** -1.961*** 
N=558 (t-stat) (-2.855) (-3.610) (-4.768) (-4.507) (-4.655) 
 median -0.414*** -0.707*** -1.021*** -0.993*** -1.629*** 
 (z-stat) (-4.770) (-4.321) (-5.217) (-4.575) (-4.991) 
       
UNEXPOSED Insurers mean -0.121 -0.484 -0.217 0.779 0.614 
N=158 (t-stat) (-0.623) (-1.186) (-0.481) (1.239) (0.828) 
 median -0.388* -0.517 -0.411 0.052 0.202 
 (z-stat) (-1.806) (-1.228) (-0.883) (0.997) (0.886) 
       
ΔCAREXPOSED-UNEXPOSED mean -0.203 -0.241 -1.140* -2.489*** -2.575*** 
 (t-stat) (-0.854) (-0.554) -(1.950) (-3.160) (-2.911) 
 median -0.026 -0.190 -0.610* -1.045*** -1.831*** 
 (z-stat) (-0.856) (-1.007) (-1.910) (-3.039) (-3.134) 
Panel B: Level of Loss Exposure (for Insurers with Some Loss Exposure) 
HIGH Exposure(Q4) mean -0.459* -2.073*** -3.307*** -4.192*** -4.969*** 
N=139 (t-stat) (-1.695) (-3.840) (-4.586) (-4.182) (-4.530) 
 median -0.895*** -1.755*** -2.703*** -2.994*** -3.443*** 
 (z-stat) (-2.807) (-4.638) (-4.945) (-4.661) (-4.998) 
       
LOW Exposure(Q1) mean -0.374** -0.247 -0.922** -0.376 -0.233 
N=140 (t-stat) (-2.234) (-0.880) (-2.063) (-0.614) (-0.330) 
 median -0.411*** -0.439 -0.913*** -0.493 -0.988 
 (z-stat) (-2.854) (-1.136) (-2.787) (-1.169) (-0.909) 
       
ΔCARHIGH-LOW Δmean -0.085 -1.826*** -2.385*** -3.817*** -4.736*** 
 (t-stat) (-0.267) (-3.014) (-2.816) (-3.7546) (-3.635) 
 Δmedian -0.484 -1.316*** -1.790*** -2.501*** -2.455*** 
 (z-stat) (-1.212) (-3.401) (-2.735) (-3.382) (-3.747) 
Notes: The table reports market adjusted cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for different event windows following our 
sample of mega-catastrophes by an insurer’s loss exposure (defined as the ratio of homeowners’ premium earned in the 
affected states to total homeowners’ premium earned). Both the results for exposed and unexposed insurers (Panel A) as 
well as for exposed insurers in the highest (Q4) and lowest (Q1) quartile of the distribution of loss exposure are shown 
(Panel B). Also, the differences in CAR between exposed and unexposed firms (ΔCAREXPOSED- UNEXPOSED) as well as firms 
in the highest and lowest quartile of the distribution of loss exposure are reported (ΔCARHIGH-LOW). To test for the statistical 
significance of CAR, we employ a two tailed t-test as well as the non-parametric Mann–Whitney–Wilcoxon test. *, **, and 
*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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The table reports market adjusted cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for different event windows following our sample of 
mega-catastrophes by an insurer’s loss exposure (defined as the ratio of homeowners’ premium earned in the affected states 
to total homeowners’ premium earned). Both the results for exposed and unexposed insurers as well as for exposed insurers 
in the highest (Q4) and lowest (Q1) quartiles of the distribution of competition are shown. To test for the statistical 
significance of CAR, we employ a two tailed t-test as well as the non-parametric Mann–Whitney–Wilcoxon test. *, **, and 
*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Table A.IV  
Cumulative Abnormal Returns by Competition 
  CAR[0,+1] CAR[0,+5] CAR[0,+10] CAR[0,+15] CAR[0,+20] 
Panel A: All Insurers 
HIGH Competition (Q4) mean 0.017 -0.032 -0.854* -1.447** -1.756* 
N=155 (t-stat) (0.085) (-0.091) (-1.786) (-1.975) (-1.935) 
 median -0.032 0.093 -0.302 -1.036** -1.299** 
 (z-stat) (-0.666) (0.372) (-1.363) (-2.010) (-2.158) 
       
LOW Competition (Q1) mean -0.076 0.507 0.694 1.188** 0.941* 
N=186 (t-stat) (-0.399) (1.385) (1.459) (2.206) (1.674) 
 median -0.366** -0.259 0.231 0.844* 0.364 
 (z-stat) (-2.075) (-0.082) (0.640) (1.861) (1.174) 
       
ΔCARHIGH-LOW mean 0.093 -0.539 -1.548** -2.635*** -2.697*** 
 (t-stat) (0.336) (-1.054) (-2.277) (-2.955) (-2.613) 
 median 0.334 0.352 -0.533 -1.880*** -1.663** 
 (z-stat) (0.895) (0.361) (-1.467) (-2.740) (-2.436) 
Panel B: Exposed Insurers 
HIGH Competition (Q4) mean -0.199** -0.139 -1.217*** -2.380*** -2.851*** 
N=117 (t-stat) (-2.075) (-1.338) (-2.910) (-3.542) (-3.557) 
 median -0.133** -0.091 -0.573** -1.186*** -1.425*** 
 (z-stat) (-2.396) (-0.414) (-2.231) (-3.231) (-3.682) 
       
LOW Competition (Q1) mean -0.055 0.450 0.665 1.005 0.632 
N=153 (t-stat) (-0.243) (1.056) (1.189) (1.609) (0.965) 
 median -0.397* -0.353 0.307 0.622 0.111 
 (z-stat) (-1.762) (-0.480) (0.396) (1.207) (0.236) 
       
ΔCARHIGH-LOW mean -0.144 -0.589 -1.882** -3.385*** -3.483*** 
 (t-stat) (-0.443) (-1.043) (-2.350) (-3.332) (-2.944) 
 median 0.264 0.262 -0.880* -1.808*** -1.536** 
 (z-stat) (0.180) (0.451) (-1.690) (-2.604) (-2.126) 
Panel C: Unexposed Insurers 
HIGH Competition (Q4) mean 0.684 0.301 0.263 1.425 1.613 
N=38 (t-stat) (1.646) (0.299) (0.276) (0.955) (0.936) 
 median 0.196 0.276 0.182 0.761 0.106 
 (z-stat) (1.066) (0.558) (0.123) (0.036) (-0.007) 
       
LOW Competition (Q1) mean -0.174 0.773 0.829 2.035** 2.374** 
N=33 (t-stat) (-0.784) (1.276) (1.185) (2.237) (2.662) 
 median -0.264 0.408 0.080 2.536** 2.852** 
 (z-stat) (-1.099) (1.027) (0.634) (1.974) (2.332) 
       
ΔCARHIGH-LOW mean 0.858* -0.472 -0.566 -0.610 -0.761 
 (t-stat) (1.744) (-0.387) (-0.466) (-0.336) (-0.375) 
 median 0.460 -0.132 0.102 -1.775 -2.746 
 (z-stat) (1.430) (-0.173) (-0.565) (-1.280) (-1.579) 
